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, Joan-Ramon Borrell Corresponding author: Universitat de Barcelona, Dep. d’Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada- Institut d'Economia Aplicada (IREA) - Grup de Governs i Mercats (GiM), 1-11 John M. Keynes Street, Spain; and, University of Navarra, IESE Business School, Public-Private Sector Research Center. jrborrell@ub.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Carmen García Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Juan Luis Jiménez Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 20, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 181–205, https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhae007
Published:
26 May 2024
Article history
Received:
06 September 2023
Revision received:
11 April 2024
Accepted:
08 May 2024
Published:
26 May 2024
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Joan-Ramon Borrell, Carmen García, Juan Luis Jiménez, José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro, Short and Long Run Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability and Prosecution, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 20, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 181–205, https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhae007
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Abstract
This study investigates the effects of leniency programs on cartel duration, cartel fines, and the length of investigations, providing empirical insights that contribute to the ongoing debate regarding their theoretical and empirical implications. The introduction of leniency programs in two different jurisdictions (EU and Spain) at different times and the exogeneity of the introduction date enable us to identify their impact using difference-in-differences estimations. We empirically show that leniency programs, by destabilizing existing cartels, allow for the detection of the longer-lasting ones in the short run. In the long run, our results suggest that destabilization effects prevail, and leniency programs discourage the creation of new cartels. Specifically, our findings indicate that the duration of detected cartels almost doubles in the short run and nearly halves in the long run. Finally, our study reveals that the introduction of leniency programs results in a significant increase in the average fines per cartel case, both before and after taking into account the fine reductions resulting from these programs. This suggests that leniency programs contribute to stronger sanctions against cartels, enhancing their general deterrent effect. However, our findings also indicate that leniency programs lengthen the average duration of cartel investigations, which may hinder the ability of competition authorities to proactively pursue other cases.
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